Turning Back the Clock: Japan’s Misguided Postal Law is Back on the Table by Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Julia Muir
N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 7   uP da t e d   o c t o b e r   2 0 1 0
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW     Washington, DC 20036     Tel 202.328.9000     Fax 202.659.3225     www.piie.com
Turning Back the Clock: 
Japan’s Misguided Postal 
Law is Back on the Table
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Julia Muir
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Reginald Jones Senior Fellow since 1992, was 
the Maurice Greenberg Chair and Director of Studies at the Council on 
Foreign Relations (1996–98), the Marcus Wallenberg Professor of Interna-
tional Finance Diplomacy at Georgetown University (1985–92), senior 
fellow at the Institute (1981–85), deputy director of the International Law 
Institute at Georgetown University (1979–81), deputy assistant secretary 
for international trade and investment policy of the US Treasury (1977–
79), and director of the international tax staff at the Treasury (1974–76). 
Hufbauer has written numerous books on international trade, investment, 
and tax issues, including Figuring Out the Doha Round (2010) and 
US Taxation of Foreign Income (2007). Julia Muir has been a research 
analyst at the Peterson Institute since March 2010.
© Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. All rights reserved.
On October 8, 2010, the Japanese Cabinet approved legislation 
that would reverse a decade’s worth of effort to fully privatize 
key subsidiaries of Japan Post Holdings Co. Ltd. Besides postal 
services, the state-run postal system offers banking and insur-
ance services, through Japan Post Bank (JPB) and Japan Post 
Insurance (JPI), respectively. These are the financial engines of 
Japan Post and were the units slated for full privatization. Both 
subsidiaries have long received favorable government treatment, 
tilting  the  playing  field  against  private  banks  and  insurance 
firms, whether foreign or domestic. The government of Japan 
is in clear violation of its commitments under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and if the Diet passes the legislation, 
Japan will reverse the efforts made by the United States and the 
European Union, as well as domestic private banks and insur-
ance firms, to establish a level playing field. What’s more, Japan 
risks having a formal WTO dispute brought against it. 
Former  LDP  Prime  Minister  Junichiro  Koizumi  made 
privatization of Japan Post a signature issue. In 2005, a bill to 
fully privatize Japan Post was passed, and by October 1, 2007, 
the  state-run  postal  service  was  split  into  four  companies 
under the umbrella of Japan Post Holdings Co. Ltd. The new 
companies are Japan Post Service, Japan Post Network, Japan 
Post  Bank,  and  Japan  Post  Insurance.  Under  the  Koizumi 
reforms, privatization of JP Holdings and the two financial 
subsidiaries was scheduled for completion by 2017. 
In August 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
came  to  power  led  by  former  DPJ  Prime  Minister  Yukio 
Hatoyama, after campaigning for the reversal of the Koizumi 
reforms. Together with kingmaker Ichiro Ozawa, then secre-
tary-general of the DPJ, and Shizuka Kamei, then-minister 
of state for financial services and postal reform, Hatoyama 
was well on his way to achieving this objective. On May 31, 
2010, with almost no debate, the Lower House approved the 
legislation to reverse the Koizumi plan. The legislation would 
restructure JP Holdings and allow the government to hold 
one-third of its shares indefinitely, essentially a controlling 
position. Under the new legislation, JP Holdings, Japan Post 
Service, and Japan Post Network would be merged into a single 
holding company. JPB and JPI would then be subsidiaries of 
the newly merged parent company, with at least one-third of 
their shares held indefinitely by the holding company. 
Following Hatoyama’s surprise resignation on June 2, it 
was unclear what the fate of the postal legislation would be. 
As long as Hatoyama was prime minister, the government 
hoped to pass the bills before the Diet adjourned on June 16. 
However, on June 10, the DPJ, led by Hatoyama’s successor 
Naoto Kan, announced that consideration of the postal bills 
would be postponed until the next Diet session. The next day, 
Kamei, chief architect of the bills, announced his resignation 
from the cabinet. 
Kamei,  however,  was  able  to  arrange  for  then-secretary-
general of the People’s New Party (PNP), Shozaburo Jimi, to be 
named as his successor. And the legislation has been submitted to 
the Diet in nearly identical form (only the implementation date 
has been changed), with the Government having placed the bills 
at the top of its legislative agenda for the current Diet session.  In 
addition, Prime Minister Kan as well as Minister Jimi and MIC 
Minister Yoshihiro Katayama have pledged to do everything in 
their power to achieve prompt passage of the legislation.
The current draft of the postal legislation is designed to 
tilt the playing field even further in favor of Japan Post and 
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clearly  violates  Japan’s  commitments  in  the WTO.  Conse-
quently,  the  United  States  and  the  European  Union  have 
vigorously lobbied the Japanese government to reconsider the 
Japan Post bills, even to the point of holding joint high-level 
WTO talks with Japan in Geneva. This suggests that without 
dramatic changes by Japan, things are headed toward a formal 
WTO dispute, one which Japan would likely lose. 
Preferences TilTing The Playing field 
At the end of the second quarter of 2009, employment in 
JP Holdings and its subsidiaries numbered 226,000, a roster 
that  makes  the  company  a  potent  force  in  Japanese  poli-
tics. With  ¥177 trillion in deposits (roughly $1.9 trillion), 
JPB is the largest financial institution in the world. It holds 
approximately 31 percent of Japan’s total bank deposits and 
maintains the nation’s largest network of branches, all nestled 
in post offices. JPI is Japan’s largest insurance provider, with 
¥7.9  trillion  (about  $86.6  billion)  of  annual  premium 
income,  effectively  controlling  23  percent  of  the  domestic 
market. Together, these two companies have assets of more 
than $3 trillion. Both receive preferences that allow them to 
operate outside the normal regulatory framework. 
These preferences include: 
n  preferential (near-exclusive) access for provision of savings 
deposits  and  insurance  services  through  the  post  office 
network; 
n  exemptions from a range of provisions under the Insur-
ance Business and Banking Laws, including from licensing 
requirements and bank and insurance holding company 
rules; and
n  exclusive access by JPI to subsidized revenues from over 
50 million government-guaranteed and privileged insur-
ance policies sold by Japan Post prior to October 2007. 
These and other preferences give JPI and JPB a decisive and 
unfair advantage over private banks and insurance firms in 
market access, regulation, and financial credibility. 
Market Access
The mandate of JP Holdings is to provide the “largest collec-
tion  and  delivery  networks  […]  continuously  providing 
universal services.” Through the Japan Post network of roughly 
24,500 post offices located in all 47 prefectures, JPI and JPB 
have preferential (near-exclusive) access for the provision of 
savings deposits and insurance services. By contrast, private 
insurers have access to just 1,000 post offices, in which they 
are permitted to sell only a limited range of policies (term life 
and supplemental insurance), whereas JPI, which operates in 
over 22,000 post offices, has the right to sell its entire range of 
products. The ability to provide banking and insurance servic-
es through the government-owned post office network allows 
JPB and JPI to capture a large segment of the market due to 
the impression that their financial services are government-
guaranteed, as they were until recently.
Regulatory Framework
As public entities, JPI and JPB are exempt from the rigorous 
regulatory oversight that all other banks and insurance compa-
nies must face. The Financial Services Agency, responsible for 
the regulation of all banking and insurance services, supposed-
ly regulates JPB and JPI. However, JPI is granted preferential 
treatment through exemptions from the Insurance Business 
Law,  which  governs  the  actions  of  all  other  private  insur-
ers. Private insurance companies (domestic and foreign) are 
subject to strict licensing requirements as specified in Chapter 
I, Article 3(1) of the Insurance Business Law, which states: 
[N]o  insurance  business  may  be  operated  without 
having obtained a license from the Prime Minister.
JPI  is  exempt  from  these  requirements,  being  entitled 
to  fully  engage  in  the  life  insurance  business  through  the 
legislative  grant  of  a  “deemed  license”  without  undergoing 
the licensing pre-approval process that private insurers face.   
Unlike private sector insurers, JPI’s license is not revocable. 
Financial Credibility
Kampo and Yucho, predecessors of JPI and JPB, enjoyed a 
government guarantee of full payment to all holders of insur-
ance policies and savings deposits. Kampo was also not obli-
gated to make payments to the Life Insurance Policyholder 
Protection Corporation, unlike all other domestic and foreign 
companies, which must pay insurance premiums under the 
terms of the Insurance Business Law. Similarly, Yucho was not 
obligated to pay deposit insurance premiums to the Bank of 
Japan. The Life Insurance Association of Japan estimates that 
Kampo saved ¥92.2 billion (about $1 billion) between 1993 
and 2002, while payments by private insurers amounted to   
¥638 billion (roughly $6.9 billion) during that same period. 
The Koizumi initiative has eliminated the government guar-
antee of full payment to all holders of JPI insurance policies 
and JPB savings deposits. However, both companies continue 
to enjoy a “de facto” government guarantee as they remain 
100 percent government-owned-and-controlled entities and 
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WTO and BilaTeral cOmmiTmenTs 
Japan did not take an exemption when it signed the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in 1994. Thus, from 
the first days of the WTO era, the operations of Japan Post 
and its financial units were inconsistent with National Treat-
ment Article XVII:1 of the GATS, which states: 
[E]ach  Member  shall  accord  to  services  and  service 
suppliers  of  any  other  Member,  in  respect  of  all 
measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no 
less favorable than that it accords to its own like services 
and service suppliers. 
Article XVII:3 goes on to explain: 
[T]reatment shall be considered to be less favorable if 
it modifies the conditions of competition in favor of 
services or service suppliers of the Member compared to 
like services or service suppliers of any other Member. 
Private foreign banks and insurance firms suffer no more 
discrimination  from  Japan  Post’s  dominant  position  than 
private  domestic  banks  and  insurance  firms—both  groups 
have been seriously disadvantaged. However, the language of 
GATS Article XVII clearly shows that the current operations of 
JP Holdings have been inconsistent with Japan’s international 
commitments. The proposed postal legislation now contains 
elements that are newly inconsistent with the government of 
Japan’s national treatment obligations under the GATS, there-
by threatening to not only derail the Koizumi reform train 
but also exacerbate existing violations of Article XVII by the 
Japanese government. At issue is not only a debate between 
Japan on the one hand and the United States and the Euro-
pean Union on the other. It is also a question of leveling the 
playing field for private insurers and bankers, whether domes-
tic or foreign. The United States and the European Union 
worked for years to get the Japanese government to imple-
ment reforms, and Koizumi’s proposed privatization plan was 
in part designed to respect Article XVII and level the playing 
field for all private firms. However, the new legislation will 
reverse these efforts to create a fair and competitive market. 
The proposed postal legislation would not only further violate 
Japan’s commitments under GATS but also set a dangerous 
precedent for other Asian countries, notably Korea and China, 
which all operate similar “all purpose” postal services. 
The United States has a clear interest in the Japanese bank-
ing and insurance markets. At the end of 2009, US foreign 
direct investment stock in the Japanese financial and insurance 
sector was approximately $29 billion. US balance of payments 
earnings for financial services in Japan were $1.2 billion, plus 
another  $0.9  billion  for  insurance  services.  US  insurance 
companies account for 12.2 percent of the Japanese life insur-
ance market. Under the new legislation, US firms would face 
substantially increased competition from JPB and JPI, which 
already benefit from a range of favorable provisions uniquely 
accorded to them by the government, as described earlier. 
reversals under The neW legislaTiOn
Under  the  new  postal  legislation,  the  preferences  that  JPI 
and JPB already enjoy will become more pronounced. The 
government  will  retain  a  minimum  one-third  share  of  the 
restructured JP Holdings, and the caps will be raised from   
¥13 million ($140,000) to ¥25 million ($270,000) for insur-
ance policies and from ¥10 million ($100,000) to ¥20 million 
($220,000) for savings deposits. Moreover, JPI and JPB will be 
able to expand their scope of business. The current regulatory 
framework requires approval by the Financial Services Agency 
and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, which 
are required to “listen to the opinion” of the Postal Privatiza-
tion Commission before new lines are offered. Under the new 
bills only a notification by JPI is required. Cross-subsidization 
between entities under the JP Holdings umbrella would also 
be made easier under the proposed legislation. 
These prospective changes rightly alarm private insurance 
companies and banks. For private insurers the more lenient 
requirements  for  JPI  business  expansion,  coupled  with  a 
doubling of the JPI insurance cap, would give JPI the advantage 
of underwriting a range of new products. The lopsided regula-
tory environment would also allow JPI to increase its market 
share in new sectors while limiting the operational freedom of 
private companies. For the banking industry, the doubling of 
deposit limits, coupled with the de facto government guarantee, 
could prompt a shift of funds from commercial banks to JPB. 
seTTing a PrecedenT?
Korea, China, and India all have postal companies that offer 
banking and insurance services. All three are signatories to 
GATS. Among these, Korea is the only one that scheduled 
Japan’s proposed reversal of the Koizumi 
postal reforms and its refusal to consider 
the interests of private banks and insurance 
firms are bad news for the existing trading 
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exemptions in financial services. Korea’s exemptions fall under 
the GATS Most Favored Nation (MFN) Article II and relate to 
banking and other financial services. Its schedule of exemption 
states that: 
[F]uture  liberalization  measures  affecting  the  entry 
and provision of financial services in or relating to the 
Republic of Korea will be granted only to those coun-
tries that accord MFN treatment to financial services 
or financial service suppliers of the Republic of Korea. 
Korea’s reciprocal exemption applies to all countries and is 
indefinite. In addition, Korea scheduled limitations on national 
treatment under its GATS commitments with respect to busi-
ness operations.
While China did not schedule any exemptions, the imple-
mentation of its commitments has come under scrutiny. Under 
China’s  schedule  of  commitments,  foreign  life  and  non-life 
insurers and insurance brokers are permitted to provide services 
in specific cities but with limitations on the scope of life insur-
ance  products.  China’s  commitments  to  liberalize  banking 
and  other  financial  services  have  similar  restrictions.  These 
limitations are to be phased out over time; however, China’s 
compliance has been questioned. US and EU disputes have 
been lodged in the WTO concerning measures affecting foreign 
suppliers of financial information services (e.g., Reuters and 
Bloomberg) and credit card processing services. 
China  Post  Group  includes  China  Post  Savings  Bank 
(CPSB) and China Post Life Insurance (CPLI). While both 
companies are fairly new (CPSB was launched in early 2007 and 
CPLI was approved in September 2009), their goals are simi-
lar to that of Japan Post: establishing the largest banking and 
insurance network in the country. CPSB is already the country’s 
second largest bank in terms of outlets and fourth largest bank 
in terms of deposits, totaling roughly $290 billion in 2009.
Korea  and  India  have  similar  systems,  and  while  their 
postal savings banks and postal insurance providers have not 
achieved the scale of JPB and JPI, they have taken advantage of 
their expansive postal networks to capture remote rural markets. 
If the new bill for JP Holdings is passed, then Korea, India, and 
especially China, may pursue similar regulatory protection. 
cOnclusiOn
Japan’s proposed reversal of the Koizumi postal reforms and its 
refusal to consider the interests of private banks and insurance 
firms are bad news for the existing trading system and rules 
of liberal services trade. The exclusion of the world’s largest 
financial  entity  from  rigorous  oversight  generates  systemic 
risk, and this risk would dramatically increase if JPI and JPB 
were permitted to enter into new business areas such as lend-
ing without the appropriate know-how. Even Bank of Japan 
Governor  Masaaki  Shirakawa  has  noted  as  much  on  more 
than one occasion. Additionally, the diversion of even more 
resources from the Japanese private sector into the funding of 
government products will only contribute to the continued 
stagnation of the Japanese economy. 
Moreover, Japan would be setting a dangerous precedent 
for other Asian countries. The Japan Post reform legislation 
would create a system that allows JP Holdings to dramati-
cally expand its dominance in banking and insurance. If Japan 
goes down this road, other Asian powers will surely take note, 
and some will be tempted to emulate the Japanese example.   
This  would  truly  represent  a  major  step  backward  for  the   
global economy.
If  the  Diet  passes  the  postal  legislation,  Japan  would 
expand the violation of its obligations under the WTO, ignore 
its G-20 commitments to resist protectionism, and alienate its 
close economic partners in the United States and Europe. All 
this would occur during Japan’s 2010 hosting of Asia-Pacific 
Economic  Cooperation  (APEC),  including  the  Economic 
Leaders’ Meeting, which will be attended by President Obama 
and many other heads of state. It will also come at a time when 
Japan is weighing whether to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) in order to shore up its alliance with the U.S. and rein-
vigorate its domestic economy. Passage of WTO-inconsistent 
postal reform legislation would send a negative signal about 
Japan’s willingness to undertake serious FTA commitments, 
which go above and beyond WTO.
In 2011, the hosting of APEC will shift to the United 
States,  which  can  be  expected  to  promote  an  agenda  that 
includes high-standard Asia-Pacific economic integration. In 
addition, efforts to bring the Doha Development Round to 
a successful close will continue. In this environment, Japan’s 
political leadership must reconcile its desire to be a global 
leader with the fallout from domestic economic policy initia-
tives  that  the  international  community  finds  protectionist. 
Put simply, Japan will have difficulty gaining credibility as 
a constructive player in international forums (including the 
G-20,  WTO,  and  APEC)  until  the  Government  of  Japan 
levels  the  playing  field  between  JPB  /  JPI  and  the  private 
sector and remedies the WTO inconsistencies in the current 
postal regime and the postal legislation.
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